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Abstract
Online romance scams are a prevalent form of mass-marketing
fraud in the West, and yet few studies have addressed the tech-
nical or data-driven responses to this problem. In this type of
scam, fraudsters craft fake profiles and manually interact with
their victims. Because of the characteristics of this type of fraud
and of how dating sites operate, traditional detection methods
(e.g., those used in spam filtering) are ineffective. In this paper,
we present the results of a multi-pronged investigation into the
archetype of online dating profiles used in this form of fraud, in-
cluding their use of demographics, profile descriptions, and im-
ages, shedding light on both the strategies deployed by scammers
to appeal to victims and the traits of victims themselves. Fur-
ther, in response to the severe financial and psychological harm
caused by dating fraud, we develop a system to detect romance
scammers on online dating platforms.
Our work presents the first system for automatically detecting
this fraud. Our aim is to provide an early detection system to stop
romance scammers as they create fraudulent profiles or before
they engage with potential victims. Previous research has indi-
cated that the victims of romance scams score highly on scales
for idealized romantic beliefs. We combine a range of struc-
tured, unstructured, and deep-learned features that capture these
beliefs. No prior work has fully analyzed whether these notions
of romance introduce traits that could be leveraged to build a
detection system. Our ensemble machine-learning approach is
robust to the omission of profile details and performs at high ac-
curacy (97%). The system enables development of automated
tools for dating site providers and individual users.
1 Introduction
The online romance scam is a prevalent form of mass-marketing
fraud in many Western countries [22, 24, 8, 32]. Cybercrim-
inals set up a false user profile on dating websites or similar
online platforms (e.g., social networking sites, instant messag-
ing platforms) to contact potential victims, posing as attractive
and desirable partners [31]. Once contact has been established,
scammers apply a range of techniques to exploit their victims.
In many cases, they engage in a long-term fictitious romantic re-
lationship to gain their victims’ trust and to repeatedly defraud
them of large sums of money [9].
∗A shorter version of this paper appears in IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security. This is the full version.
Recently, the FBI [26] reported a total loss of $85 million
through online romance scams in the US. On an individual level,
IC3 complaint data showed that an average of $14,000 was lost
per reported incident of online dating fraud. Furthermore, many
victims find it difficult to seek support due to being left trauma-
tized by the loss of the relationship, and suffer from the stigma
of being an online dating fraud victim [32].
Despite the magnitude of this type of cybercrime, there is
an absence of academic literature on the practical methods for
detecting romance scammers. Previous work has mentioned
that online dating sites are employing both automated and man-
ual mechanisms to detect fake accounts, but do not discuss the
specifics [9, 4]. Some dating sites are known to use static in-
formation such as blacklists of IP addresses or proxies to iden-
tify alleged scammers [23]. However, these countermeasures
can easily be evaded through e.g., low-cost proxy services us-
ing compromised hosts in residential address spaces. Deal-
ing with online dating fraud is challenging, mainly because
such scams are not usually run in large-scale campaigns, nor
are they generated automatically. As a result, they cannot be
identified by the similarity-detection methods used for spam fil-
tering. Dating websites are designed for connecting strangers
and meeting new people, which renders the concept of unso-
licited messages—a key element of most state-of-the-art anti-
spam systems—strategically useless [9]. Finally, romance scam-
mers will send a series of ordinary, personalized communications
to gain their victims’ trust. These communications highly resem-
ble messages between genuine dating site users. In many cases,
the actual scam is performed after a few weeks or months and af-
ter communication has moved to other, unmonitored media [31].
Therefore, it is essential to identify romance scammers before
they strike.
Given that the online dating profile is the launching point for
the scam, it is important to learn a) how scammers craft pro-
files to draw in potential victims and b) if there are any distin-
guishing features of these profiles which can be identified for
automatic detection. This is a distinct problem from the detec-
tion of Sybil attacks or cloned profiles [19], existing methods for
which typically rely upon graph-based defences or markers of
automated behaviour, neither of which are applicable here. Pre-
vious research has indicated that the victims of romance scams
score highly on scales for idealized romantic beliefs [2]. Thus,
a scammer profile might be expected to exploit these notions of
romance when designing their dating profile. To the best of our
knowledge, no prior work has analyzed how these notions of ro-
mance appear as traits in dating profiles, or whether these traits
can be leveraged to build a scammer detection system.
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In this paper, we present a machine-learning solution that
addresses the detection of online dating fraud in a fully auto-
mated fashion, which is widely applicable across the dating site
market—including by the users themselves. More specifically,
we combine advanced text categorization and image analysis
techniques to extract useful information from a large dataset of
online dating user profiles and to automatically identify scammer
profiles. The key contributions of our work are as follows:
• We leverage a large public database of romance scammer
profiles, in combination with a large random sample of
public profiles from a matched online dating site to under-
stand the characteristic distinctions between scammer pro-
files and those of regular users.
• We design three independent classification modules which
analyze different aspects of public profile characteristics.
• We synthesize the individual classifiers into a highly accu-
rate ensemble classification system. Even when parts of
the profile information are omitted, our system can reliably
distinguish between scammer and real user profiles (F1=
94.5%, ACC= 97%), resulting in a solid solution which
should generalise well to other dating sites.
To enable replication and foster research we make
our tool publicly available at https://github.com/
gsuareztangil/automatic-romancescam-digger.
This paper proceeds as follows. In §2 we describe our dataset
and the observed characteristics of real and scammer dating
profiles. In §3 we discuss the architecture of our ensemble
classification system. In §4 we detail the division of the data for
training, test and validation purposes, and present our results,
before discussing related work in §6 and concluding with final
remarks in §7.
2 Characterizing Dating Profiles
Though variations exist within the market, typical dating profiles
consist of at least one image of the user, some basic information
about their key attributes, and a self-description used as a ‘sales
pitch’. Our approach to scam detection focuses on these com-
mon profile components, which are present across the market.
In what follows, we compare the characteristics of real dating
profiles with those which are designed by scammers, and detail
what we can learn about scammer targets and strategies from the
differences between them.
2.1 Data
The data we use comes from a dating site datingnmore.com,
and the connected public scamlist at scamdigger.com. This
dating site distinguishes itself from the market on the basis of its
lack of romance scammers. It screens its registrants and mem-
bers to identify scams, which are then listed openly to warn the
general public and anyone whose likeness may be being appro-
priated by the scammers. Our dataset combines an exhaustive
scrape of the scammer profiles and a large random sample of
one-third of the ordinary dating profiles as of March, 2017. In
total, our dataset is composed of 14,720 ordinary profiles, and
5,402 scammer profiles1. The sampling of the dating site was
spread over a member index sorted by registration date, to ensure
comparison with the scamlist compiled over the site’s operation.
All data used in this paper is publicly available, with no re-
quirement to register, log in or deceptively interact with users of
the dating site to collect it. Nevertheless, in the interests of pri-
vacy, no personally identifying information is revealed in this pa-
per, including that of reported scammers. To enable replication
of our results, we make available two scripts which implement
the data-harvesting process that created our dataset. This enables
replication while allowing dating site users to “withdraw” from
future study by removing their profile from public view. The re-
search was approved by the relevant Institutional Review Board
(IRB).
The attributes available for scammer profiles and genuine pro-
files are slightly different. The scamlist profiles include the IP
address, email address and phone number used by the scam-
mer when registering, along with bookkeeping information on
the justification used for the decision that a profile is a scam.
These variables are not present in the public member informa-
tion. Contrarily, there are attributes visible on public member
pages—related to the dating interests of members—which were
not duplicated to the scamlist for scammer profiles. For the pur-
poses of informing discriminative and widely-applicable classi-
fiers, we focus on those attributes which are available for both
types of profile, which we divide into the following three groups:
• Demographics: Simple categorical information relating to
the user, such as age, gender, ethnicity, etc.
• Images: One or more images of the user. The dating site
mandates that only images showing your own face may be
used as an avatar, and users are usually motivated to include
pictures that illustrate their hobbies.
• Description: A short textual self-description from the user,
in which they advertise their key traits and interests.
Different techniques are required to extract meaningful infor-
mation from these profile attributes. In the following, we cover
the preprocessing required for each group, and the notable fea-
tures of scammer and real dating profiles.
2.2 Profile Demographics
Dating site demographics act as a filter for users. At the crudest
level, most users will be searching for a particular gender of part-
ner. Typically, age and other information about a person will also
play a role in their match candidacy. In response to such filter-
ing, users may withhold or lie about certain demographic char-
acteristics to make themselves seem more desirable to potential
partners. For most real dating site users, any such deceptions or
omissions must be low-level, as they intend for a personal re-
lationship to result [7]. Romance scammers, however, have no
expectations of a real relationship, and are highly motivated to
1There were roughly 3,500 scammer profiles in the original data, but these in-
cluded ‘or’ values where specific attributes which annotators had seen the profile
present differently were given multiple values. We exploded these ‘or’ attributes
into different profiles to analyze the profile-variants, but in all analysis that fol-
lows were careful to avoid assigning profile-variants from one original profile to
different sets or folds.
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(a) Profile ethnicities (b) Profile marital statuses
Figure 1: Ethnicity and marital status, with 95% CIs
engage in this form of deception. The information they present
in profiles should thus in no way be taken as an accurate mea-
sure of their true demographics. However, the attributes selected
in their profiles can reveal much about their overall strategies for
attracting potential victims for romance fraud, and even, implic-
itly, who their targets may be.
Age, Gender, Ethnicity and Marital Status The gender dis-
tribution of both real and scam profiles was identical: about 60%
of profiles are male. This highlights that romance scamming is
not a gender-specific problem, in line with the understanding of
previous studies [31]. The average age of real and scam pro-
files was around 40 in both cases. However, the distribution of
ages differs significantly. Within real profiles, the average age of
male and female profiles is the same, but within scam profiles the
average age of females is roughly 30, and the age of male pro-
files is roughly 50. This bimodal distribution around the mean
of real profile ages points at scammer understanding of gendered
dating preferences—men here prefer younger, physically attrac-
tive partners, while women prefer partners with higher socio-
economic status, who may be older [11].
As reported in Fig. 1a, the ethnicities claimed by scammers
are intriguing. The high proportion which claim to be white is
unsurprising, as this is the ethnicity of most of their intended
victims. However, the dating site has a large Hispanic popula-
tion, but the scammers rarely pretend to be Hispanic. Instead,
the second most popular ethnicity amongst scam profiles is Na-
tive American, a very small population amongst the real data.
This would seem to reflect some criteria of desirability which
perhaps is related to the fact that dating scams are often targeted
at a US-based population.
As Fig. 1b displays, while both real and scam users were
mostly single, scammers prefer to present themselves as wid-
owed rather than any of the other categories. This is unsurpris-
ing, as female scam victims often talk about such a trait being
a successful strategy to gain their sympathy and trust [31]. Less
desirable statuses such as divorced or separated were underrep-
resented in scam profiles, and scammers were far less likely than
real users to be married or in a relationship.
Occupation There were a wide variety of occupations, sev-
eral being misspellings or rephrases of others. Responses were
grouped into 45 occupation areas. Tables 1a and 1b reflect the
TABLE I: Topmost occupation areas by presented gender
(a) Male profiles
Real Freq Scam Freq
other 0.15 military 0.25
self 0.07 engineer 0.25
engineer 0.07 self 0.10
tech. 0.05 business 0.06
student 0.05 building 0.06
retired 0.05 other 0.04
building 0.05 contract 0.04
service 0.04 medical 0.03
transport 0.04 manager 0.02
manual 0.03 sales 0.02
(b) Female profiles
Real Freq Scam Freq
other 0.15 student 0.21
student 0.10 self 0.16
carer 0.08 carer 0.10
service 0.06 sales 0.07
clerical 0.06 military 0.05
teacher 0.06 fashion 0.04
retired 0.05 business 0.04
self 0.04 other 0.04
medical 0.04 finance 0.03
housewife 0.03 service 0.03
major occupation areas for male and female profiles respectively.
In both cases, approx. 15% of real and 4% of scam responses
were not well-captured by occupation groupings, this category of
‘other’ reflecting a long tail of unique occupation responses. For
both males and females, the most frequent occupation response
for real profiles was “retired”, a value which was extremely rare
in scam profiles.
Table 1a presents a strong bias of scam profiles towards mili-
tary and engineering professions. The desirability of male mili-
tary profiles is a bias romance scammers are already well-known
for exploiting [31]. The masculine and high-status image of en-
gineering might similarly explain its use by scammers. Other
professions listed display a similar approach: business (in many
cases, the raw response being “businessman”), medicine (i.e.,
“doctor”) and contracting professions which might lend them-
selves to explanations for why a person would later require
money to be sent overseas. As shown in Table 1b, female scam
profiles present less clearly suspicious occupations, with ‘stu-
dent’ and ‘carer’ groups leading. The appearance of ‘fashion’
further down the list does speak towards a desirability bias (e.g.,
“model”). The ‘military’ group makes a surprising appearance—
no real female profiles claimed such a role—even more oddly,
this occupation is selected mostly by female profiles aged over
40. This may be an attempt to generalize the “military scam”
used in male profiles, but its strategy is unclear. For the most
part, female scam occupations fit with previous suggestions that
scammers are exploiting the desirability of a young, dependent
female partner in low-paying or non-professional work [31].
This role naturally lends itself to an explanation for why a person
might need financial support.
Figure 2: Worldwide location of scammer and real profiles
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(a) Original. (b) Fake Image. (c) Original. (d) Fake Image.
(e) Original. (f) Fake Image. (g) Original. (h) Fake Image.
Figure 3: Certain contexts such as the military, academic or the
medical one are often used to attract vulnerable users2.
Location The location data reported in profiles was usually
given to the city level, although the specificity did vary, partic-
ularly within scammer profiles. The original location responses
were geocoded to provide lat/lon points, and country of origin
factors. As shown in Fig. 2, the scam profiles mostly claim to
be in the US or Western Europe. Corresponding with the ear-
lier observation of a low incidence of claimed Hispanic ethnicity,
scammer profiles rarely claim to be located in Latin America or
Spain, despite a large real user population from these areas. This
suggests that a substantial Spanish-speaking population of the
dating site is not (yet) being targeted, possibly due to language
barriers.
With regard to the targeted national locations, the concen-
tration of scammer profiles in the US is highly notable, with
nearly three-quarters of scam profiles with given locations claim-
ing to be resident there. The secondary targets were the UK
and Germany. More plausibly honest responses, such as Ghana,
may be reactions to the dating site’s methodology of comparing
IP geolocations to declared location [4]. The distribution sug-
gests scammers are targeting rich, Western and mostly English-
speaking nations.
Scammer profiles most often declared locations which were
well-known Western cities. The most frequent city response
was New York, being roughly 13% of all scammer locations,
followed by Los Angeles (7%) and then London, Dallas, Mi-
ami, Houston and Berlin. Selecting well-known and large cities
avoids the need for intricate knowledge of a smaller city/town
and makes it easier for a scammer to remotely obtain enough
detail to appear plausible. This approach also enables a travel
narrative—commonly, a wealthy businessman originally from a
large city but currently away on business.
2.3 Image Recognition
The use of images plays an important role in online dating sites.
The right set of pictures can both maximize the number of peo-
ple interested in a profile and help users to limit interactions to
a certain type of person. This can be leveraged by criminals to
reach a larger number of potential victims and to attract vulnera-
ble users.
Scammers typically select the face of a publicly available im-
2Publicly available images from https://www.romancescam.com/
(a) Real. (b) Real. (c) Scammer. (d) Scammer.
Figure 4: Sample of images from our dataset. Faces from real
profiles have been redacted to preserve the anonymity.
age and build a fake persona with other images from different
desirable contexts. The military context is recurrently exploited
[31] as certain vulnerable victims seek a ‘knight in shining ar-
mor’. Other popular contexts are the academic and medical ones,
where scammers pretend to be practitioners, students or patients.
Fig. 3 shows how a scammer faked an image of a high-ranked
military officer to impersonate a third party. We next study how
to extract semantics from images to better understand the choices
made by both legitimate users and scammers when selecting pro-
file pictures.
As mentioned earlier, the data available in our dataset for the
scammers category and the real category differs slightly. For the
scammers dataset there are samples available with multiple im-
ages per profile. Conversely, for the real dataset there is usually
only one picture per profile. Overall, we found images in ap-
proximately 65% of the profiles3. While the proportion of pro-
files with images is equivalent in both types of categories, the
absolute number of images per profile is larger in the scammers
dataset. Specifically, there are 0.65 images per profile in the real
dataset and 1.5 in the scammers one. Note that there may be
variation in the distribution of images per profile category across
different dating sites. However, in our dataset, fraudsters tend to
share more information than legitimate users.
A common theme found in both types of profiles is the use
of pictures where users not only show their physical appearance,
but also convey a sense of the hobbies or interests the person
holds. Fig. 4 shows four examples of images found in our dataset
where subjects are, for instance, riding or sailing.
As it is relevant how scammers present themselves in their
profile pictures, we next elaborate on how to extract meaningful
information from them. Recent work in the field of computer
vision [10, 28] has shown that it is possible to automatically de-
scribe the content of an image accurately using deep learning.
The key idea is to train a deep network with a large corpus of
images for which there is a ground truth of visible context. The
resulting network is then expected to i) know how to recognize
elements appearing in the images and ii) be capable of generating
an adequate description.
For the purpose of this work, we mainly rely on [28] to
build a generative model based on a deep Neural Network (NN).
The system consists of a convolutional NN combined with a
language-generating recurrent NN. The model has been built
using a very extensive dataset distributed by Microsoft called
COCO (Common Objects in Context)4 with over 300,000 im-
ages. The output of the system is a meaningful description of the
3Without including the default site avatar: .
4http://mscoco.org/
4
image given as input.
For each image in a profile, we output the description that best
represents (according to the model) the semantics involved in
the picture. Fig. 4 shows images from four different profiles,
two in the real category and two in the scammer category. We
next show the full output extracted from the images shown in
Fig. 4. For each image we output three possible descriptions
with probability p.
Descriptions automatically generated from Fig. 4a:
1. A man riding a motorcycle down a street (p = 72.2e− 04)
2. A man riding a bike down a street (p = 29.3e− 04)
3. A man riding a bike down the street (p = 3.7e− 04)
The descriptions shown above have been extracted from the
image of a profile belonging to the real category. The image
shows a man standing over a bicycle in the street. The descrip-
tion in 1) guessed that the man is riding a motorcycle. This
misconception can most likely be attributed to the headlight and
the ad banner over it (uncommon in bikes). Descriptions 2) and
3) however are guessed correctly with a probability of the same
magnitude. We argue that this type of mistake is orthogonal to
our problem. Confusing objects of similar kinds should not have
a negative impact as long as the main activity is correctly inferred
(i.e.: a man riding down the street).
Descriptions automatically generated from Fig. 4b:
1. A man standing in a boat in the water (p = 28.0e− 05)
2. A man standing in a boat in a body of water (p = 9.9e− 05)
3. A man in a suit and tie standing in the water (p = 2.1e− 05)
The afore set of descriptions also belong to the real category.
The image shows a man standing in the deck of a boat as cor-
rectly predicted.
Descriptions automatically generated from Fig. 4c:
1. A man riding on the back of a brown horse (p = 11.8e− 03)
2. A man riding on the back of a horse (p = 1.3e− 03)
3. A man riding on the back of a white horse (p = 0.9e− 03)
The descriptions shown above have been extracted from the
image of a profile belonging to the scammer category. The im-
age shows a young man riding a brown horse. All three descrip-
tions complement each other by adding additional details of the
image. It is common to find misappropriated images that do not
belong to the scammer—either because they have been stolen
from a legitimate profile or because they have been taken from
elsewhere on the Internet). A reverse search of the image does
not reveal the source.
Descriptions automatically generated from Fig. 4d:
1. A man sitting in front of a laptop computer (p = 13.1e− 03)
2. A man sitting at a table with a laptop (p = 3.6e− 03)
3. A man sitting at a table with a laptop computer (p = 2.0e− 03)
These descriptions belong to an image from the scammer cat-
egory. The image shows a middle aged man sitting in front of a
laptop and a table in the background. This image together with
others found in the same profile are stock images.
It is worth noting the level of detail shown in each caption,
which not only identifies the main actor within the picture (a
man in these cases), but also the backdrop and the activity being
undertaken.
There are a number of common topics displayed across im-
ages in both profiles. When looking at the gender of the people
present in the images, we can observe that males appear in about
60% them as shown in Table 2. This matches with the distribu-
tion of gender reported in the profile demographics.
Table 2: Topics found across profiles with images.
Type Real Profiles Scam Profiles All
Male 57.75% 63.76% 60.48%
Groups 0.50% 2.22% 1.28%
Children 5.21% 3.38% 4.38%
Food 1.86% 3.62% 2.66%
Animals 0.77% 1.08 % 0.91%
Discriminant 13.76% 17.77% 15.58%
There are also a number of topics slightly more prevalent in
one or the other profile categories, i.e.: group pictures (including
couples), pictures with children, or presence of food (e.g., wine,
bbq, cake). For instance, there are over four times more group
pictures in the scammers category than in the real one. Con-
trastingly, the number of images with children in real profiles is
almost double. Combining together all informative elements of
the images, we can observe that about 15% of images contain
descriptions that appear exclusively in one of the two categories
(referred to as ‘discriminant’ profiles in Table 2). This indicates
that there is a large number of images for which their context can
be used to characterize scammers. In other words, scammer pro-
files feature more pictures of certain groups. Note that fraudsters
frequently iterate through certain themes known to be appeal-
ing (e.g.: men in uniform). This might also simply be down to
the availability of images which the scammer steals e.g., those
from stock photo databases). The image shown in Fig. 4d, for
instance, is a stock image.
2.4 Profile Descriptions
Contrary to most real-life encounters, on dating websites, a user
can easily disclose very personal information, such as their life
story, what they are looking for in a partner, their hobbies, their
favorite music, etc., to a complete stranger and without being in-
terrupted. Moreover, filling in a personal description is usually
highly encouraged by any dating website, because it can cap-
ture other users’ attention and increase the chances of meeting a
user’s ‘perfect match’.
For scammers, however, the profile description provides yet
another means to mislead their victims. Prior research has shown
that they will go to great lengths to create the ‘ideal’ profile, to
gain a potential victim’s interest and to maintain the pretense of
a real (online) relationship [31, 33]. As a result, most scam-
mers in our dataset—5,027 out of 5,402—attempted to create an
attractive user account by advertising broad pretended interests
and characteristics. The real users were less inclined to provide
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such personal information about themselves: only 5,274 (out of
14,720) generated a profile description.
Recent advances in natural language processing technology
have enabled researchers to perform automatic linguistic analy-
ses of lexical, morphological, and syntactic properties of texts.
However, most traditional studies use large sizes of training data
with a limited set of authors/users and topics, which usually leads
to a better performance of the machine learning algorithms. Pro-
file descriptions are, however, typically short and can include
a whole range of different topics. With regard to the dataset
described in this paper, the average number of words per pro-
file description was 78.7, with scammers producing more words
on average (104.5) than genuine users (54.1), This effect is so
pronounced that despite there being fewer scammers than real
users, the overall total of 525,336 words for the scam category
was greater than the 285,407 words for the real category. The
finding that scammers’ profiles have a higher word count com-
pared to genuine profiles is consistent with previous literature
stating that liars tend to produce more words [6]. To analyze the
variety of topics that are present in our dataset, we used dictio-
nary terms that are mapped to categories from the LIWC 2015
dictionary [18]. Category frequencies were recorded for each
profile description. Our results showed that scammers referred
considerably more to emotions—both positive and negative—
than genuine users. Additionally, they use words related to fam-
ily, friendship, certainty, males and females more often, while
real users tend to focus on their motives or drivers (e.g., affilia-
tion, achievement, status, goals), work, leisure, money, time and
space. With regard to language use, we found that scammers
use more formal language forms, while genuine users displayed
more informal language forms (e.g., Netspeak).
3 Classifying False Profiles
A high-level overview of our system can be obtained from Fig. 5.
The system is first trained using a dataset of real and scam pro-
files. The goal of this phase is to obtain the following key ele-
ments that will later be used to identify fraudsters:
(i) A set of prediction models P = {P1, . . . , Pi } that output
the probability
θi(φ1, . . . , φn) = Pi[X = scam | (φ1, . . . , φn)]
of each profile X being scam given a feature vector
(φ1, . . . , φn) obtained from different profile sections i.
(ii) A weighted model f(P) = ∑wi · Pi that combines all
individual predictions in P . Here, each individual classifier
Pi is weighted by wi according to the accuracy given on
a validation set that is different from the training one. This
will also serve as a way to calibrate individual probabilities.
The final classifier will then output a decision based on a
vote such that
f =
{
scam if f(P) < τ
real otherwise,
where τ is a threshold typically set to
⌊∑
wi
2
⌋
+ 1.
Table 3: Our proposed set of features.
ID Source Name Type |θi|
θM Demographics
Age NF
Gender CF
Latitude NF
Longitude NF
Country CF 237
Ethnicity CF
Occupation CF
Marital Status CF
θC Captions
set(entities) CF
363set(actions) CF
set(modifiers) CF
θS Descriptions set(ngrams) SBF 105,893
For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the model presented
in (ii) as weighted-vote. One can simplify the model by giving
equal weight to allwi (typicallywi = 1) and obtaining a nominal
value for Pi before voting. In other words, applying a threshold
for each Pi (e.g., 0.5) and creating an equal vote among partic-
ipants. We refer to this non-weighted voting system as simple-
vote.
3.1 Feature Engineering
Our work considers a diverse set of features in order to build a ro-
bust classification system. The proposed set of features contains
elements obtained from three different sources: (i) structured at-
tributes of the profile referred to as demographics and denoted as
θM , (ii) features extracted from raw images referred to as cap-
tions (θC), and (iii) features extracted from unstructured text (de-
scription denoted as θS). Based on the preprocessing described
in Section 2, we extract different types of features as described
below.
• Numerical Features (NF): refers to those attributes from a
profile that take a quantitative measurement such as the age
(18-85) of a person.
• Categorical Features (CF): refers to those attributes that
take a limited number of possible values such as the gender
(male or female).
• Set-based Features (SBF): refers to those attributes that
can take an arbitrary number of values and the relationship
between sets of attributes is relevant (e.g., words in the de-
scription).
Table 3 shows the set of features proposed categorized by the
source in the profile. For θM we considered the age, and the
Cartesian location values as numerical values, while other at-
tributes were treated as categorical. As described previously,
common occupation responses were grouped into 45 different
occupation areas (e.g., self-employed, military, legal). Long-tail
occupation responses outside of these categories were grouped
under other. In training, no such response appeared more than
twice, and 85% of real and 96% of scammer occupations were
captured by known categories.
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Figure 5: Key features extracted from dating profiles.
For θC , after extracting the most representative caption per
image, we removed the least informative elements and retained
only entities (nouns), actions (verbs), and modifiers (adverbs and
adjectives). Each element in the caption was stemmed to a com-
mon base to reduce inflectional forms and derived forms. Rath r
than treating the captions as set-based features, we encoded them
as categorical features, as the order of the actions is not rele-
vant in this document vector approach. Generated captions are
simple and their structure always follows the same pattern. The
presence of a given action and the set of objects appearing in the
image is itself informative. Encoding the relationship between
the different parts of speech would unnecessarily increase the
number of features.
Finally, we extracted set-based features from the textual con-
tent of the tokenized descriptions (θS). We considered Bag-of-
Words (BOW), word n-grams, character n-grams and LIWC fea-
tures. Because word bigrams (n-grams of length n = 2) yielded
the best results during our preliminary experiments and combin-
ing different feature types did not lead to better classification
results, we only included word bigrams in the rest of the exper-
iments. Additionally, stemming and stop word removal resulted
in a worse performance, so all features were included in their
original form during the experiments.
3.2 Prediction Models
Because most of the fields are optional, user profiles in online
dating sites are inherently incomplete. Some users are uncom-
fortable with high levels of self-disclosure and some are more in-
terested in contacting others than presenting details about them-
selves [30]. Thus, any reliable detection system should be able to
flexibly deal with incomplete profiles. In this section, we present
three independent classifiers to estimate the presence of fraud-
ulent profiles. Each classifier is designed to effectively model
a section of the profile (based on θM , θC and θS as described
previously). Probability outputs from each classifier are later
combined to provide one balanced judgement. By using mul-
tiple classifiers designed on individual sections of the profile, we
increase the likelihood that at least one classifier is capable of
making an informed decision. Moreover, ensembles often per-
form better than single classifiers [3].
Demographics Classifier The demographics classifier uses
the greatest variety of original profile attributes. Unlike the im-
age and description classifiers, handling this feature set means
dealing with non-binary missing data situations—location and
ethnicity might be missing for a given profile which still con-
tains age and gender information. When no data is available, the
least-informative prior is the base rate of real vs scam profiles,
as is used in the image and description classifiers. In most situ-
ations within the demographics data more information than this
is available, and should be used.
Approaches for handling missing data—in the situation where
the case cannot be discarded, such as appearing in a test or vali-
dation set—reduce to either some form of imputation or the use
of a classifier robust to missing values, such as a Naive Bayes
approach. Given problematic randomness assumptions inherent
to the most useful imputation methods, we opt to use a Naive
Bayesian classifier to handle prediction for profiles with missing
data attributes.
However, Naive Bayes is not the most effective classifier for
profiles with all data present—a significant proportion of the
dataset. For this subset, it is more effective to use a classi-
fier which performs better and does not handle cases with miss-
ing data. In our case, a Random Forests model was selected.
The final approach to providing PM (X = scam) is to train a
joint Random Forests and Naive Bayes model, using the high-
performing Random Forests model to make predictions where
all demographic data is available, and the gracefully-degrading
Naive Bayes model for all other cases.
Images Classifier We build a prediction model based on the
features extracted from the captions of the images such that
PC(X = scam). The architecture of our system is highly flex-
ible and accepts a wide range of classifiers. Our current im-
plementation supports Support Vector Machine (SVM), Random
Forests and Extra Randomized Trees. For the purpose of this pa-
per, we selected SVM with radial kernel as the base classifier for
the images.
SVM has been successfully applied to fraud detection in the
past [1] and has been shown to have better performance com-
pared to 179 classifiers (out of 180) on various datasets [5]. SVM
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also tends to perform well when the number of samples is much
greater than the number of features, as it is the case here. In
addition, it is less sensitive to data outliers—instead of minimiz-
ing the local error, SVM tries to reduce the upper bound on the
generalization error.
Descriptions Classifier Previous work [33] has shown that
scammers attempt to keep their labor costs down to be able to
exploit different social media and to continuously produce the
interaction that is required to make their on-going scams suc-
ceed. To achieve this goal, they tend to edit pre-written scripts
that are often shared on underground forums—labeled by the
ethnicity, age group, location and gender of the potential vic-
tim. Hence, for providing PS(X = scam), we compared the
performance of two approaches: (i) a similarity-based approach,
in which we applied shingling (k = 5) to extract the set of all
substrings from each profile description in training and calcu-
lated the Jaccard similarity for each pair of profile descriptions
(see [14]); and (ii), we trained an SVM algorithm (linear kernel)
as implemented in LibShortText [34], an open-source software
package for short-text classification and analysis. Parameters for
both approaches were experimentally determined on a small sub-
set of each training partition during cross validation. Within the
SVM experiments, features were represented by TF-IDF scores,
which reflect the importance of each feature (in this case, each
word bigram) to a document (i.e. a user profile description) in
terms of a numerical frequency statistic over the corpus [14].
Ensemble Classifier The goal of this method is to combine
the predictions of the base estimators described above to im-
prove the robustness of the classification. Ensemble methods
are designed to construct a decision based on a set of classi-
fiers by taking a weighted vote of all available predictions. In
our system, we have a function f that is estimated using an
independent set of samples. This function will then be used
during testing to weight each prediction model Pi such that:
f(PM , PC , PS) = {scam,real}.
For the decision function f we use a Radial Basis Function
(RBF) that measures the distance to the center of the SVM hyper-
plane bounding each Pi. This function is defined on a Euclidean
space and it only measures the norm between that point and the
center (without considering the angular momentum). This func-
tion is approximated with the following form
f =
∑
wiδ(||pi||),
which can be interpreted as the sum of the weights wi times the
probability score pi ∈ Pi given by the individual classifiers in
the voting system described above.
Single Classifier We compare the results of our ensemble
method to the predictions made by a single SVM classifier (lin-
ear kernel) in which all demographics, captions and description
features are included in each document instance. Features were
represented by their absolute values and parameters were again
experimentally determined on a small subset of each training
partition during cross validation.
4 Evaluation
In evaluating and developing the classification system described
before, we applied the following methodology.
Methodology We divided the dataset into a 60% training set, a
20% test set and a 20% validation set. Profiles were assigned to
each set randomly under a constraint preventing variants of the
same scam profile from being assigned different sets or folds.
Development of the classification system proceeded as follows:
1. Each component classifier was designed within the 60%
training set, and individual performance levels established
through ten-fold cross-validation within this set.
2. Once classifier design was complete, each component clas-
sifier was trained on the full training set.
3. To design the ensemble model, each classifier produced
probabilities and labels for the test set. The ensemble was
developed on these probabilities, and performance was es-
tablished through five-fold cross-validation on the test set.
4. Based on performance within the test set, the ensemble
model and the choice of outcomes to report within the vali-
dation set was decided.
5. For final validation, individual classifiers were trained on
the training set, produced probabilities and labels for the
testing set and the validation set, the ensemble model was
trained on the probabilities given for the test set, and its
predictions taken for the validation set.
6. The single classifier was trained on the combination of the
training and test data and evaluated on the validation set.
4.1 Classification Results
We present our results together with a number of case studies,
covering all four dimensions of the classification performance:
(i) scam profiles correctly classified (TP), (ii) real profiles cor-
rectly classified (TN), (iii) real profiles misclassified (FP), and
(iv) scam profiles misclassified (FN).
Summary Table 4 presents the results within the validation set
for each classifier, for simple majority voting between all three
classifier outputs, and for the SVM ensemble model trained on
the classifier probabilities given for the test set. Precision, recall
and F1 are given for predicting scam profiles (the minority class).
Judging performance by F1, the best individual classifier was the
SVM description classifier (F1 = 0.842). As can be expected, the
similarity-based approach (threshold Jaccard similarity of 0.259)
yielded a high precision score, but a low recall score, which re-
sulted in a markedly lower F1 of 0.712. The demographics clas-
sifier was the next best component classifier (F1 = 0.840), but
the captions classifier was highly precise, making only two false-
positive judgements. Simple majority voting between classifier
labels improved performance significantly compared to any in-
dividual classifier, raising F1 to 0.904, with a precision of 0.996.
A single classifier using all features outperformed majority vot-
ing (F1 = 0.927). The ensemble system outperformed both the
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Table 4: Final results for each component classifier, simple ma-
jority voting, a similarity-only approach, a single classifier using
all features, and the weighted-vote ensemble
CLASSIFIER TN FN FP TP PREC. REC. F1 ACC
demographics 2725 196 149 903 0.858 0.822 0.840 0.913
captions 2872 499 2 600 0.997 0.546 0.705 0.874
description 2758 215 116 884 0.884 0.804 0.842 0.917
similarity-only 2939 435 28 571 0.953 0.568 0.712 0.884
simple-vote 2870 189 4 910 0.996 0.828 0.904 0.951
single 2820 108 54 1027 0.950 0.905 0.927 0.959
weighted-vote 2834 78 40 1021 0.962 0.929 0.945 0.970
Excluding new variants
demographics 2725 122 149 569 0.792 0.823 0.808 0.924
captions 2872 378 2 313 0.994 0.453 0.622 0.893
description 2758 119 116 572 0.831 0.828 0.830 0.934
simple-vote 2870 129 4 562 0.993 0.813 0.894 0.963
weighted-vote 2818 53 56 638 0.919 0.923 0.921 0.969
Excluding all variants
demographics 2707 114 167 577 0.776 0.835 0.804 0.921
captions 2874 426 0 265 1.000 0.384 0.554 0.881
description 2731 171 143 520 0.784 0.753 0.768 0.912
simple-vote 2860 159 14 532 0.974 0.770 0.860 0.951
single 2829 98 45 592 0.929 0.858 0.892 0.960
weighted-vote 2841 69 33 622 0.950 0.900 0.924 0.971
single classifier and majority voting at 0.945 F1, significantly im-
proving recall whilst maintaining a high level of precision. Over
97% of all profiles were classified correctly. Fig. 6 characterises
the ROC performance for this ensemble depending on whether
variants (near-duplicate profiles) were excluded.
Feature Analysis We describe some of the most important fea-
tures as identified by our classifiers.
Table 5a presents the total decrease in node impurities from
splitting on the each feature in the RF component of the demo-
graphics model, averaged over all trees. The most important fea-
ture was the occupation area reported in the profile. Node purity
rankings are known to bias towards factors with many levels, but
the size of the interval between the occupation area and the other
features suggests that this ranking is genuine. This would accord
with our observations in 2.2 about the use of occupation area as
an attractive status marker.
Table 5b presents the highest-weighted bigrams from the de-
scriptions classifier for the purpose of predicting the scam cat-
egory. The most informative features tend to relate to nonflu-
encies in English (starting descriptions with ‘Im’ or ‘Am’, con-
structs like ‘by name’) and attempts to overtly signal a roman-
tic or trustworthy nature (e.g.,“caring”, “passionate”, “loving”).
Our topic analysis in Section 2.4 also captures this tendency of
scam profiles to include more emotive language.
Table 5c presents the most discriminant features for the cap-
tions classifier. Features with a negative weight are more infor-
mative when discriminating real profiles. Instead, features with
positive weight relate to scam profiles. Interestingly, some of the
top elements embedded in the images map with relevant traits
observed in the demographics such as the occupation (e.g., mili-
tary) or the gender (e.g., male) c.f. §2.2.
True Positives About 98% of the scam profiles have been de-
tected by at least one of the classifiers. Consensus between
classifiers accounts for the majority of TPs, but performance
Figure 6: ROC for the ensemble classifier
Table 5: Top-ranked features for component classifiers
(a) Feature ranking de-
mograpics RF
feature purity
occupation 332.70
latitude 198.02
status 128.76
longitude 128.71
age 114.24
ethnicity 110.53
gender 64.52
(b) Top-weighted bigrams for
scam descriptions
bigram weight
<start> im 0.3086
don t 0.2318
caring and 0.1776
and caring 0.1674
by name 0.1644
<start> am 0.1643
am just 0.1641
that will 0.1572
am here 0.1568
tell you 0.1481
(c) Feature raking captions
Keyword weight
pizza -1.0
picture -0.52
child -0.50
bottle -0.46
christmas -0.46
driving 1.0
military 1.0
birthday 2.0
group 2.46
male 2.95
improves yet further when resolving disputes using classifier
weights learned on an independent sample in the ensemble vot-
ing scheme. Under this scheme, we manage to detect about 93%
of the fraudulent profiles with a high degree of confidence, com-
pared to 81% when only relying on the simple voting scheme.
Roughly 36% of scammers were identified by all three classi-
fiers.
For illustration, we present one TP case randomly chosen from
those identified with a high degree of confidence. This is the case
of a profile presenting as a 26 year old African American female,
with the occupation reported as “studant”. In the description,
we can see certain traits uncommon in legitimate profiles, like
the intention to establish a “great friendship”. The misprint on
the occupation and the poor language proficiency in the descrip-
tion might indicate that the fraudster lacks fluency in the English
language.
Hi., Am Vivia. How are you doing? I would be very happy
to have a great friendship with you. my personal email is (
<user>@hotmail.com ) I look forward to hearing from you, Vivia
There are two images in the profile, which match the demo-
graphics reported. Specifically, one of the images has a young
9
woman sitting on a park bench, while the other shows the same
woman sitting in a study room with a laptop. The prevalence of
certain elements such as the use of laptops across stock scam pro-
file images could explain the decision taken by the image classi-
fier.
True Negatives All real profiles have been identified as such
by at least one of the classifiers. When combining the decisions,
our system correctly classified 99.9% real profiles using simple-
vote and about 98.6% using weighted-vote.
Our randomly selected exemplar case is that of a 55 year old
white woman. This user is based in Mexico, a location compar-
atively underpopulated by scam profiles. It is worth noting that
the age also deviates significantly from the average age of female
scammers (30).
This profile had an avatar image showing the face and shoul-
ders of a woman. All the elements in the image looked con-
ventional, which is most likely why the classifier identified the
profile as real. It is worth noting the poor quality of the im-
age. Although the quality of the images was not measured in
this work, we noticed that fraudsters care about it, and intend to
investigate this further. Comparing the profile description to the
previous TP example, the overall fluency is notably higher, both
in terms of English grammar and the appropriate format (as a
self-description rather than a message). The user describes her-
self and her interests, rather than focusing entirely on the reader.
False Positives There are a total of 4 real profiles misclassi-
fied under our most precise setting, for a false positive rate of
0.1%. For those 4 profiles there was at least one classifier that
correctly predicted the profile and, interestingly, all three classi-
fications were available. This means that none of the errors can
be attributed to a lack of information. Under weighted-voting
the false positive rate rises to 1.4%. When looking at the errors
common to both voting schemes, we only find 2 misclassified
real profiles. Both errors come from predictions by the demo-
graphics and descriptions classifiers.
From the demographics, we see that one profile is widowed,
common amongst scammers, and the other is mixed-race, which
is slightly more common amongst scammers. Both users claim
locations with high scammer population: Texas in the US, and
close to London in the UK. One of the profile descriptions was
very short, and focused on the nature of their intended relation-
ship and the qualities of the intended partner. The other was
long, but both referred to topics which are more strongly corre-
lated with fraud, such as relationships and positive emotions.
False Negatives For misclassified scam profiles, weighted-
voting produced 78 errors and simple-voting produced 189 er-
rors. Out of all errors, we find 22 cases where all three individual
classifiers failed. Manual analysis of these cases reveals that cer-
tain parts of the profiles look genuinely normal. In general, the
image caption classifier was most likely to produce false nega-
tives, and overall errors occurred when either of the demograph-
ics or description classifiers agreed. Of the two, the description
classifier was slightly more likely to produce FNs.
Such is the case of a 45 year old American solider from
Louisiana named Larry. While the description is ordinary, the
occupation raises suspicions due to the prevalence of military
scammers. When there is a technical draw between the demo-
graphics and the descriptions and the images are not informative
enough one can only aim at extracting additional features. For
instance, in the case of Larry, the messages he exchanged with
a victim are valuable. The excerpt below shows a message sent
to one of his victims wherein one may observe distinguishable
wording and a clear manipulative strategy in parts highlighted
below:
I must confess to you, you look charming and from all I read on your profile
Id want you to be my one special woman. I wish to build a one big happy
family around you. Im widowed with two girls, Emily and Mary, I lost their
mom some years ago and since then Ive been celibate. I think youve got all
it takes to fill the vacuum left by my late wife to me and the kids. I seek to
grow old with you, children everywhere and grey hairs on our head. I wanna
love you for a life time. Hope to read from you soon. You can addme on
facebook <user> or mail me at <user>@yahoo.com. Looking forward to
your message. Regards, Larry. —A message sent to a victim
Adding such elements from later steps in the scam life-cycle
could help to cover the cases where all three individual classi-
fiers failed. However, these features are not necessarily available
for all deployment situations, and would restrict more general
application of the model.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we established the need for a systematic approach
that automates online romance scammer detection. The system
we presented is a key first step in developing automated tools that
are able to assist both dating site administrators and end-users in
identifying fraudsters before they can cause any harm to their
victims. However, there are risks in deploying such automated
systems, principally:
i) Risk of denying the service to legitimate users.
ii) Risk of having scammers that have evaded the system.
We next discuss these implications and the limitations.
5.1 Context-based Performance Maximization
Under our current system, 96% of profiles identified as scam-
mers truly are, and about 93% of all scammers are detected. This
performance is optimized for the harmonic mean of these rates.
One might further tune the model, either for minimizing the de-
tection of false positives or minimizing the false negatives. This
decision will rely on the priorities of the user of a classification
tool:
Minimizing FP – when real profiles are misclassified, users
are inconvenienced by being flagged as scammers and are
likely to be annoyed at a platform that does this. Thus, de-
tection systems being run by dating sites must review alerts
or risk losing customers. To reduce workload and costs,
dating sites may want to minimize the risk of misclassify-
ing real users, and use user-reporting and education tools to
catch scammers who evade preemptive detection.
Minimizing FN – when scam profiles are misclassified, a user
risks being exposed to a scammer and suffering emotionally
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and financially as a result. Given that the opportunity cost is
comparatively low for potential partners being filtered out,
a “better safe than sorry” attitude is justified. As such, safe-
browsing tools that a user deploys themselves may wish to
bias towards always flagging scammer profiles, as the user
may always disable or ignore such a tool if convinced it is
in error5.
The simple voting classifier presented in Table 4 provides an
easy example of a system biased towards minimising false posi-
tives, with only 4 appearing in a set of nearly 3,000 real profiles.
If all three classifiers were required to agree before a profile was
classified as a scam (unanimous voting), then the false positive
rate would be too low for this study to detect (0 observed). Alter-
nately, if the firing of any classifier was sufficient reason to flag
a profile, only 22 scammer profiles in over 1,000 would escape
being flagged.
Returning to the better-performing machine-weighted voting
system, the ensemble system could be optimized for any risk ra-
tio by optimization towards a modified F-score. The F-score can
be weighted towards any desired ratio of precision (minimizing
false positives) and recall (minimizing false negatives) by adjust-
ing the β parameter in the general equation:
Fβ = (1 + β
2) · precision · recall
(β2 · precision) + recall
where the β expresses the ratio by which to value recall higher
than precision. By selecting an appropriate balance between
these measures and then evaluating classifiers against this mea-
sure, a weighted voting system can be tuned to individual risk
tolerances.
5.2 Comparison with Moderator Justifications
The moderators who identified profiles as romance scammers
provide a list of justifications for their decision on each profile.
By analyzing the given justifications, we can examine our classi-
fier’s performance next to individual human strategies for scam-
mer identification.
Table 6 presents figures for the proportion of scam profiles
labeled with common justifications. The figures are counted in
terms of profiles and not profile-variants. Alongside figures for
all scam profiles are figures for the validation set upon which the
ensemble system was tested, and figures for the scam profiles
which the ensemble classifier mislabeled as non-scam profiles
(false negatives).
Certain observations can be made. Firstly, on overall justifi-
cation proportions across scam profiles, we can see that exami-
nation of the geolocation of a scammer’s IP address is a heavily
relied-on method for moderators, with contradictions between
this and the profile’s stated location being a justification listed
for 87% of all scam profiles. The next most common justification
was that a profile uses suspicious language in its self-description:
expressions of this ranged from identification of “Nigerian word-
ing” to moderators recognizing text being reused from previous
scams .
5Such tools may of course also allow the user to define their own risk toler-
ances.
Table 6: Comparison of overall, validation and false-negative
incidence of moderator justifications for scam-classified profiles
REASON ALL SCAMS VALID. FN REC.
IP contradicts location 3030 (87%) 620 (87%) 44 (85%) 0.93
Suspicious language use 2499 (72%) 507 (71%) 34 (65%) 0.93
IP address is a proxy 2156 (62%) 433 (60%) 25 (48%) 0.94
Known scammer picture 1379 (40%) 299 (42%) 17 (33%) 0.94
Known scammer details 1368 (39%) 284 (40%) 13 (25%) 0.95
Self-contradictory profile 1145 (33%) 242 (34%) 12 (23%) 0.95
IP location is suspicious 968 (28%) 211 (29%) 22 (42%) 0.90
Mass-mailing other users 761 (22%) 168 (23%) 10 (19%) 0.94
Picture contradicts profile 261 (7%) 55 (8%) 4 (8%) 0.93
Comparison of proportions between the overall dataset and
validation set show little deviation in justification proportion,
demonstrating a lack of bias. By comparing proportions within
the false-negative profiles to those in the overall validation set,
we may discern any systemic differences in identification rate.
Most justifications show similar or lower proportions in the
false-negative profiles, indicating that the ensemble is either no
worse than average within these subcategories, or may be bet-
ter than average. One category of justifications alone showed
worse performance for the ensemble—where the human moder-
ators judged that the IP-determined origin of the scammer was
in a country they deem suspicious (e.g., a West African nation).
The recall of profiles justified with this reason was 0.9, lower
than average. IP address information is not available for non-
scam users in our dataset, so this discrepancy cannot be fully in-
vestigated, but it might suggest that the partially location-based
demographics classifier is not yet matching expert understanding
of scam-correlated locations.
5.3 Evasion
From the previous section, we see that moderators heavily rely
on certain features, such as the IP address, that can easily be
obscured. Moderators also check if the IP address is known to
belong to a proxy. Although this could certainly be used as a fea-
ture in our system, scammers could use unregistered proxies (as
yet inexpensive) or compromised hosts in residential IP address
space to evade detection.
In contrast, our system relies on a wide range of features that
are more difficult to evade, such as textual features6; or features
for which their obfuscation might render a profile unattractive,
such as the demographics or the images.
A natural scammer response to this kind of profile detection
could be to cease hand-crafting unusually attractive or targeted
profiles, and instead turn to cloning the existing profiles of real
users from different dating sites. By preferentially cloning at-
tractive profiles, they would retain the high match-rate which
enables contact with potential victims, and by using real users’
profile information they would avoid detection systems geared
towards their own idiosyncratic profile elements. Scammers are
already partially engaging in this sort of behaviour when they
re-use images of real people taken from the web.
6Prior work in computational linguistics has shown that the combination of
(un)consciously made linguistic decisions is unique for each individual — like a
fingerprint or a DNA profile [27, 20]
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Table 7: Comparison of the profile elements used in our classifi-
cation experiments with availability of these elements on popular
dating sites. (X: present; %: requires inference)
SITE age gender ethn. marital occ. location image descr.
datingnmore.com X X X X X X X X
match.com X X X X X X X X
okcupid.com X X X X % X X X
pof.com X X X X X X X X
eharmony.com X X X X X X X X
tinder.com X X % X X
The solution to such a development will rely on the deploy-
ment of profile-cloning detection systems, such as that described
by Kontaxis et al. [12], perhaps augmented by behavioural clas-
sifiers operating on e.g., the language used in messages.
5.4 Comparison of Dating Site Elements
The datingnmore.com site used as the source of data for our
experiments is comparatively small, and has a niche appeal due
to its intensive moderation by experts in identifying online dating
fraud. It is therefore worthwhile considering its comparability to
other dating sites, as a first step to understand the generalisability
of our results.
Table 7 compares the features from the datingnmore.com
profiles which were used in our classifier with the profile ele-
ments available on five market-leading dating sites. Coverage
was good. All three of the ensemble components would be able
to operate across these sites. The image and description profile
elements are always supported, and at least some demographic
information is always available. The dating site with the fewest
profile elements in common with our features is tinder.com,
which has a distinctive locality-based use case which may hinder
the online dating fraud our system aims to detect.
5.5 Limitations & Deployment Considerations
There are limitations to our work which must be borne in mind.
Firstly, whilst we have taken pains to make use of profile fea-
tures which should be visible on other dating platforms, we
have not yet tested our classification approach on profiles from
other dating sites. It may be the case that scammers and/or real
users show different characteristics in different dating platforms,
which would limit the applicability of our method. We are cur-
rently seeking other sources of user profile data to investigate this
possibility. More information on scammer/user traits could gen-
erally inform ongoing research into—and prevention of—online
dating fraud.
Secondly, our results show a number of false negative classifi-
cations. Further inspection of the data on scammers suggests that
augmenting our approach with other classifiers—such as ones
using geolocated IP addresses or observations of on-platform
behavior (e.g., messaging)—could help capture these scammers
where the public profile information is inconclusive.
Online dating sites could deploy a detection system such as
ours on their premises at the profile registration stage. Security
administrators would then be responsible for validating and act-
ing upon the output of the classification system. How dating sites
can responsibly anticipate and respond to errors in automated
classification systems such as this is a point of policy on which
practical industry insight would be highly valuable. More gener-
ally, this raises the issue of accountability under the EU General
Data Protection Regulation, and the “right to explanation” of al-
gorithmic decisions that significantly affect a user.
In the case where our system is deployed locally, the implica-
tions of our decisions can have a paramount effect on the user.
Suppose that our system predicts that a given scam profile is safe.
This might give the user a false sense of security, and encourage
them into beginning a relationship with less caution than they
would have applied otherwise. Designing a tool which protects
users while minimizing the risk of blind trust is a challenging
interface design problem, but one which is outside the scope of
this paper.
6 Related Work
Despite the rapidly increasing number of victims7, previous
work on online dating fraud is limited, focussing mainly on case
studies [21], interviews with online dating site users about their
security practices [17] and interview and questionnaire-based
psychological profiling of victims [2, 31, 32].
Three recent studies provide insight into romance scammer
strategies. The authors of [33] carried out a study on the person-
als section of Craigslist to identify common methods of romance
scammers responding to honeypot adverts. Alongside identify-
ing approaches outside of traditional trust-building relationship-
oriented scammers (including driving users to other platforms
and delivering hooks for premium-rate numbers), they observed
scammers were mostly West African in origin, and used scraped
images of attractive women [33]. Huang et al. [9] performed a
large-scale study of dating profiles that are used by scammers,
covering 500,000 scam accounts from an anonymous Chinese
online dating site. They found that different types of scammers
target different audiences and that advanced scammers are more
successful in attracting potential victims’ attention. Finally, the
authors of [4] describe geographic variation in dating fraud pro-
files, and propose a set of methods to improve geolocation when
attackers are hiding behind proxies. While assisting in attribu-
tion of origins, these methods cannot be used for scammer de-
tection.
Although a number of solutions based on machine learning
techniques already exist to detect malicious activity on online
services (e.g., detection of spam [13, 25, 29], or false identi-
ties [20, 15]), to our knowledge, no prior work has attempted to
automatically detect romance scammers. One of the main rea-
sons for this is that the dynamics of dating websites make scam
detection more difficult than in other domains, such as email or
social networking. The intended operation of a dating site is that
previously unconnected users will reach out and initiate contact
with people they do not know, and so spontaneous, unsolicited
communications cannot be viewed as a reliable signal of mali-
cious behavior. Activities that in other areas might be considered
suspicious—contacting many users, providing false profile at-
tributes, migrating conversations to other media—could all also
be considered normal behavior amongst dating site users [9].
Moreover, romance scams are for the most part carried out by
7According to research at the Chartered Trading Standard Institute in the UK,
the number of romance scam victims will more than triple by 2019 [16].
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humans, adapting to changing circumstances, and so approaches
which rely on detecting bot-like behavior are similarly stymied.
In this paper, we address these issues by analyzing the launching
point for the scam—the user profile.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented the first framework systematiz-
ing the identification of false online dating personas. Our ex-
ploratory analysis identified the sugarcoated lures used on fraud-
ulent profiles. By analyzing the prevalence of these traits with
respect to legitimate profiles, we engineered a diverse discrimi-
natory feature set, using state-of-the-art text and image process-
ing from multiple profile segments. This feature set allowed us to
develop a set of independent classification systems which adjust
to the omission of profile details.
Our experimental results show that our system can accurately
detect online dating fraud profiles, with high precision. A case
by case analysis of our results, however, indicates that there are
certain false profiles that look genuinely real. For these cases,
we have noted that other sources of information, such as the
messages exchanged, could be very informative. As future di-
rections, we aim to more broadly examine the available data on
online dating fraud, seeking information actionable for enforce-
ment and other countermeasures. We also hope to explore the
question of how, at a local level, interventions designed to warn
and protect users from scammers can avoid forming dependences
that reduce awareness.
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lease the code used to obtain our data, the processing steps
taken to prepare it, and the implementations of each classi-
fier together with additional details of our results, all avail-
able online at https://github.com/gsuareztangil/
automatic-romancescam-digger.
References
[1] S. Bhattacharyya, S. Jha, K. Tharakunnel, and J. C. West-
land. Data mining for credit card fraud: A comparative
study. Decision Support Systems, 50(3):602–613, 2011.
[2] T. Buchanan and M. T. Whitty. The online dating romance
scam: causes and consequences of victimhood. Psychol-
ogy, Crime & Law, 20(3):261–283, 2014.
[3] T. G. Dietterich. Ensemble methods in machine learning.
In International Workshop on Multiple Classifier Systems,
pages 1–15. Springer, 2000.
[4] M. Edwards, G. Suarez-Tangil, C. Peersman, G. Stringh-
ini, A. Rashid, and M. Whitty. The geography of online
dating fraud. In Workshop on Technology and Consumer
Protection (ConPro), 2018.
[5] M. Ferna´ndez-Delgado, E. Cernadas, S. Barro, and
D. Amorim. Do we need hundreds of classifiers to solve
real world classification problems? The Journal of Ma-
chine Learning Research (JMLR), 15(1):3133–3181, Jan.
2014.
[6] J. T. Hancock, L. Curry, S. Goorha, and M. Woodworth.
Automated linguistic analysis of deceptive and truthful
synchronous computer-mediated communication. In Sys-
tem Sciences, 2005. HICSS’05. Proceedings of the 38th An-
nual Hawaii International Conference on, page 22c. IEEE,
2005.
[7] J. T. Hancock, C. Toma, and N. Ellison. The truth about
lying in online dating profiles. In Proceedings of the
SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Sys-
tems, pages 449–452. ACM, 2007.
[8] D. Hembree. Online Romance Scams Are Fleecing More
Americans. https://www.forbes.com/sites/
dianahembree/2017/06/20/romance-scam-
crimes-on-the-rise/, 2017. Online; accessed
October 2017.
[9] J. Huang, G. Stringhini, and P. Yong. Quit playing games
with my heart: Understanding online dating scams. In
Proceedings of the International Conference on Detection
of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment,
pages 216–236. Springer, 2015.
[10] A. Karpathy and L. Fei-Fei. Deep visual-semantic align-
ments for generating image descriptions. In Proceedings
of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition, pages 3128–3137, 2015.
[11] D. T. Kenrick, E. K. Sadalla, G. Groth, and M. R. Trost.
Evolution, traits, and the stages of human courtship: Qual-
ifying the parental investment model. Journal of Personal-
ity, 58(1):97–116, 1990.
[12] G. Kontaxis, I. Polakis, S. Ioannidis, and E. P. Markatos.
Detecting social network profile cloning. In Perva-
sive Computing and Communications Workshops (PER-
COM Workshops), 2011 IEEE International Conference
on, pages 295–300. IEEE, 2011.
[13] K. Lee, J. Caverlee, and S. Webb. Uncovering social spam-
mers: social honeypots+ machine learning. In Proceedings
of the 33rd International ACM SIGIR Conference on Re-
search and Development in Information Retrieval, pages
435–442. ACM, 2010.
[14] J. Leskovec, A. Rajaraman, and J. D. Ullman. Mining of
massive datasets. Cambridge University Press, 2014.
13
[15] W. Magdy, Y. Elkhatib, G. Tyson, S. Joglekar, and N. Sas-
try. Fake it till you make it: Fishing for catfishes. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1705.06530, 2017.
[16] K. Morley. One million pensioners will be on ‘suckers lists’
by 2019, 2017.
[17] B. Obada-Obieh, S. Chiasson, and A. Somayaji. ‘Don’t
break my heart!’: user security strategies for online dat-
ing. In Proceedings of the Usable Security Mini Conference
(USEC). Internet Society, 2017.
[18] J. W. Pennebaker, R. L. Boyd, K. Jordan, and K. Black-
burn. The development and psychometric properties of
LIWC2015. Technical report, 2015.
[19] D. Ramalingam and V. Chinnaiah. Fake profile detection
techniques in large-scale online social networks: A com-
prehensive review. Computers & Electrical Engineering,
2017.
[20] A. Rashid, A. Baron, P. Rayson, C. May-Chahal, P. Green-
wood, and J. Walkerdine. Who am I? analyzing digital per-
sonas in cybercrime investigations. Computer, 46(4):54–
61, 2013.
[21] A. Rege. What’s love got to do with it? exploring online
dating scams and identity fraud. International Journal of
Cyber Criminology, 3(2):494, 2009.
[22] H. Roberts. There are more ’romance scam’ victims
than ever – and people were defrauded out of 39 mil-
lion in 2016. businessinsider.com: https://goo.gl/
P9Bj6M, 2016. Online; accessed April 2018.
[23] RomanceScam. Romance Scam: IP addresses of
scammers. https://www.romancescam.com/
ipsearch.php, 2013. Online; accessed Oct 2017.
[24] ScamWatch. Scam statistics. https://www.
scamwatch.gov.au/about-scamwatch/scam-
statistics, 2017. Online; accessed October 2017.
[25] G. Stringhini, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna. Detecting spam-
mers on social networks. In Proceedings of the 26th An-
nual Computer Security Applications Conference, pages 1–
9. ACM, 2010.
[26] L. Tung. FBI: Victims of online fraud lost $800m to scam-
mers last year, 2015.
[27] H. Van Halteren, H. Baayen, F. Tweedie, M. Haverkort, and
A. Neijt. New machine learning methods demonstrate the
existence of a human stylome. Journal of Quantitative Lin-
guistics, 12(1):65–77, 2005.
[28] O. Vinyals, A. Toshev, S. Bengio, and D. Erhan. Show and
tell: Lessons learned from the 2015 MSCOCO image cap-
tioning challenge. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis
and Machine Intelligence, 2016.
[29] A. H. Wang. Don’t follow me: Spam detection in twitter.
In Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT), Proceedings of
the 2010 International Conference on, pages 1–10. IEEE,
2010.
[30] M. T. Whitty. Revealing the ‘real’ me, searching for the
‘actual’ you: Presentations of self on an internet dating site.
Computers in Human Behavior, 24(4):1707–1723, 2008.
[31] M. T. Whitty. The scammers’ persuasive techniques model:
Development of a stage model to explain the online dating
romance scam. British Journal of Criminology, 53(4):665–
684, 2013.
[32] M. T. Whitty and T. Buchanan. The online dating romance
scam: The psychological impact on victims–both finan-
cial and non-financial. Criminology & Criminal Justice,
16(2):176–194, 2016.
[33] T.-F. Yen and M. Jakobsson. Case study: Romance scams.
In Understanding Social Engineering Based Scams, pages
103–113. Springer, 2016.
[34] H. Yu, C. Ho, Y. Juan, and C. Lin. Libshorttext: A library
for short-text classification and analysis. Technical report,
2013.
14
